川普外交戰略大家都還在觀察，以下兩位重要人物寫的兩篇重要文章分別從支持與批評角度看，或可看出川普外交戰略。
歐巴馬的現在的副國務卿布林肯（Antony Blinken），投稿給紐約時報，批評川普的外交布局。在末段可見其義，個人認為就是講「價值」。儘管川普有可能對台灣更好，但個人認為「共同的價值觀」還是比「國家利益」更重要。
另一篇是可能擔任川普副國務卿的現任美國駐聯合國大使波頓（John
Bolton）所寫。那是在蔡英文當選總統次日，他寫的「打台灣牌」，好像就是川普現在所做。
下為上述二重要人物所撰二文：
【 What Is America Without Influence? Trump Will
Find Out. 】
〔 New York Times, OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR By ANTONY
J. BLINKEN December 14, 2016 〕
WASHINGTON
— In February 1945, in the twilight of World War II, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill convened in Yalta, a Russian
resort town in the Crimea, to deliberate on the direction of the war and the
peace to follow. They agreed to a postwar order managed by Roosevelt’s “Four
Policemen” — the United States, Britain, Russia and China.
Roosevelt
was convinced he could cajole Stalin into keeping his Yalta commitments to
collective security and an undivided Europe. Stalin had a very different
vision: a world shaped by spheres of influence within which the will of the
strongest prevails. In the Soviet sphere, darkness descended on Eastern Europe
for 45 years.
It fell
to President Harry Truman to contain Soviet expansionism. He built America’s
first peacetime alliances, starting in Western Europe, then in Asia. The United
States took the lead in shaping the norms, rules and institutions of what
became the liberal international order, including the United Nations, the
international financial institutions and the Marshall Plan.
The
liberal order led by the United States favored an open world connected by the
free flow of people, goods, ideas and capital, a world grounded in the
principles of self-determination and sovereignty for nations and basic rights
for their citizens. It did fall short of its ideals, often in Latin America and
Southeast Asia. Yet despite the hair-trigger tensions of the Cold War, it
produced decades of peace between the great powers while building shared
prosperity.
The
postwar order that America built now is facing acute challenges, including from
old competitors. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, is no Stalin and Russia is
no Soviet Union. But Mr. Putin does seek to recreate a Russian sphere of
influence while picking apart the liberal international order that prevailed in
the Cold War. China remains focused on stability at home, but the “new model of great power relations” it has proposed to the United States would have
us stick to our side of the Pacific and let China play the pre-eminent role on
its side.
America’s
allies in Europe and Asia are fixated on whether the Donald Trump
administration will reject the re-emergence of spheres of influence or embrace
them. They worry that, in his campaign, Mr. Trump seemed to approve of the
“strong” leadership of autocrats and favor a transactional approach to Mr.
Putin. He showed little concern about Russia’s cybermeddling in our election or
aggression in Ukraine while suggesting that NATO is “obsolete.” He argued that
the United States should get out of the business of “defending the world” and
described Japan and South Korea as free riders that should pick up the burden
of their own defense and nuclear deterrence.
He has
promised to jettison the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, ceding to
China economic leadership and strategic influence in Asia. For many Europeans
and Asians, these proclamations translate into a world in which the United
States retreats into its cocoon, and Russia and China dominate them in both
political and economic spheres.
The
United States must not see China or Russia through a zero-sum prism. The Obama
administration has deepened areas of cooperation with Beijing, from the Paris
climate agreement, the handling of the Ebola epidemic, the Iran nuclear deal
and North Korea to joint projects in developing countries. It negotiated the
New Start nuclear arms reduction treaty with Moscow and championed Russia’s
admission into the World Trade Organization.
Yet
when Russia or China challenge the principles of the liberal international
order, the United States must stand up to them. In Ukraine, Mr. Putin has
sought to change the borders of Russia’s neighbor by force while denying its
people the right to decide with which countries, unions or alliances they
associate. It is why American support for Ukraine matters.
So does
our resolute support for international law in the South China Sea. There,
China’s conduct in claiming vast territorial waters and building military
outposts on artificial islands risks undermining the freedom of navigation and
free flow of commerce upon which our prosperity depends, the peaceful
resolution of disputes that undergirds stability and the rights of allies we
have vowed to defend.
A
sphere-of-influence world would not be peaceful or stable; the United States
will not be immune to its violent disruptions. Hegemons are rarely content with
what they’ve got; the demand to expand their zones as well as cycles of
rebellion and repression within them will lead to conflicts that draw us in.
The United States would have to accept permanent commercial disadvantage as
economic spheres of influence shut us out or incite a race to the bottom for
workers, the environment, intellectual property and transparency.
America’s
greatest contribution to peace and progress has been laying the foundation for
an open, rules-based, connected world. Now we have to decide whether to
continue to defend, amend and build upon that foundation or become complicit in
dismantling it.
Antony
J. Blinken is the deputy secretary of state.
上文網址：http://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20161214/what-is-america-without-influence-trump-will-find-out/en-us/
下文搜尋一下應可見全文：
【 The
U.S. Can Play a ‘Taiwan Card’ 】
〔 The Wall Street Journal, By JOHN
BOLTON, Jan. 17, 2016 1:04 p.m. ET 〕
If
China won’t back down in East Asia, Washington has options that would compel
Beijing’s attention.
Taiwan’s
elections have returned the Democratic Progressive Party to power. Rolling over
the incumbent Kuomintang (KMT) nationalists, the DPP won both the presidency
and a legislative majority, giving it controls of both elective branches for
the first time.
President-elect
Tsai Ing-wen didn’t center her campaign on attacking the KMT policy of closer
relations with China, focusing instead on Taiwan’s lagging economy, but neither
did she reject the bedrock DPP platform of independence from China. Her
rhetoric, including...
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