中國在南海主張「九段線」聲稱擁有南海島嶼及人工島權利，被菲律賓以違反《聯合國海洋法公約》（UNCLOS）向荷蘭海牙常設仲裁法院提出南海仲裁案。
【 孔傑榮：仲裁庭的裁決對中國具法律約束力 】
〔 VOA 美國之音2016.07.12 08:07 方冰 〕
紐約—
著名國際法專家、紐約大學法學院教授孔傑榮星期一撰文指出，不管中國喜歡與否，作為《聯合國海洋法公約》的締約國，該公約的仲裁庭作出的裁判，對中國具有法律約束力。這項裁決將於美東時間星期二早晨作出。
裁決由《聯合國海洋法公約》仲裁庭作出
孔杰榮(Jerome Cohen)教授的文章首先澄清了外界不甚清楚的兩個名稱：“海牙常設仲裁法院”和《聯合國海洋法公約》仲裁庭。孔杰榮說：“大家必須了解，星期二的裁決不是由海牙常設仲裁法院作出的，而是由根據《聯合國海洋法公約》為回應菲律賓訴中國仲裁案所設的是仲裁庭（以下簡稱“仲裁庭” ）作出的。海牙常設仲裁法院只是處理行政事務的管理機構，是仲裁庭的書記處。這個仲裁庭由5位世界頂尖海洋法專家組成。”
根據海牙常設仲裁法院提供的資料，這5位專家是擔任首席仲裁員的加納籍法官托馬斯·門薩（Thomas A. Mensah）以及其他仲裁員：法國籍法官讓- 皮埃爾·科特（Jean -Pierre Cot）、波蘭籍法官斯坦尼斯拉夫·帕夫拉克（Stanislaw Pawlak）、荷蘭籍法官阿爾弗雷德·蘇斯（Alfred Soons）和德國籍法官呂迪格·沃爾夫魯姆（Rüdiger Wolfrum ）。
孔杰榮說，雖然仲裁庭作出的任何裁決都可以被以“可爭辯”為由擅自拒絕，但毫無疑問的是，“不管北京如何反复譴責仲裁庭的合法性，甚至仲裁員的能力和公正性，仲裁庭作出的裁決在法律上對中國具有約束力。”
他說，中國主張其擁有對南中國海“無可爭辯的主權”，因此拒絕仲裁庭作出的可能涉及其領土主權和海洋劃界的裁決對其具有約束力，並表示中國從未同意在這些問題上由任何第三方進行的公正仲裁。
北京批准《公約》就要接受裁決
但是孔杰榮認為，北京的辯解具有誤導性質，仲裁庭的裁決並不決定其領土主權和海洋劃界，而是對《聯合國海洋法公約》的解釋和運用。因為“仲裁庭已經表示，其裁決不是對以上這些問題作出的決定，而僅僅是對其它重要問題的關切，所有涉及的是對《聯合國海洋法公約》的解釋和運用，因此，是在仲裁庭的裁決權範圍內。”
《聯合國海洋法公約》第十五部分“爭端的解決”的第二節就是對“有約束力裁判的強製程序”作出的規定。孔杰榮表示，“《公約》要求強制解決爭端、要求各方遵守裁決，中國既然批准了《聯合國海洋法公約》，就意味著中國明確同意接受仲裁庭的裁決。”
舉例而言，什麼是這次仲裁庭裁決所及？仲裁庭可能詳述《聯合國海洋法公約》第121條第三款“不能維持人類居住或其本身的經濟生活的岩礁，不應有專屬經濟區或大陸架。” 澄清對擁有 200 海裡專屬經濟區和大陸架和 12 海裡領海的“島嶼”的定義，而並不涉及誰擁這個島嶼的主權問題。
仲裁庭也可能會澄清對在通過《聯合國海洋法公約》前就存在的國家對海洋權的申索，與《聯合國海洋法公約》之間的關係，尤其是對中國主張的概念模糊的“九段線”是否應該被認為是一種“歷史權利”的解釋。
拒絕履行《公約》的國際法捍衛者
孔杰榮表示，《聯合國海洋法公約》通過 5 位專家組成的獨立、公正的仲裁庭，清楚提供了對這些問題的決定和程序規定的詳細闡述，任何已經批准了《聯合國海洋法公約》並對其提出申訴的國家無需進一步對此表示同意。孔杰榮認為，“當中國批准了《公約》並同意受約束於強制的第三方的任何裁決時，這種同意是對中國主權和其對尊重和遵守國際條約作出承諾的自由行使，無論國際條約通過程序作出了什麼裁決。”
孔杰榮批評中國政府一方面對其拒絕履行《聯合國海洋法公約》的承諾提出“沒有說服力的辯解”，另一方面還聲稱“中國才是國際法的真正捍衛者”。
孔杰榮在文章中進一步指出，“如果一個國家已經同意了強制性第三方裁決，卻隨便放棄其莊嚴的條約承諾，不但繼續留在條約體系內，還要挑戰被授權的獨立仲裁庭作出的裁決，請大家想想，這會把世界法律體系搞成什麼樣。”
上則新聞見網址：http://www.voachinese.com/a/jerome-cohan-20160711/3414520.html
下為孔傑榮英文原稿：
【 Like it or not, UNCLOS arbitration is legally binding for China 】
〔 East Asia Forum〕
11 July 2016
Author: Jerome A. Cohen, NYU
International media have come to focus on Tuesday’s anticipated decision in the Philippines’ arbitration against China. Beijing’s recent propaganda and diplomatic blitz has raised the prominence of the case to new heights. The dispute involves no fewer than 15 issues, many of them highly technical. Yet the basic issue in the case — whether the decision will be legally binding on China as well as the Philippines — is reasonably straightforward. Still there appears to be widespread misunderstanding surrounding it.
We should recognise that this will not be a decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, as so many press reports state. That institution is the facilitating administrative institution for the arbitration tribunal that has been established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in response to the claim submitted by the Philippines against China. The decision will be made by the UNCLOS tribunal, which consists of five of the world’s leading law of the sea experts.
Although any outcome can be arbitrarily dismissed as ‘debatable’, if properly understood there should be no doubt that despite Beijing’s endlessly repeated denunciations of the tribunal’s legitimacy — and even the competence and fairness of the arbitrators — China will be legally bound by the tribunal’s decision.
China claims that it has ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the land features and waters involved in the South China Sea. It refuses to be bound by the tribunal’s anticipated decision on the grounds that the decision will necessarily deal with issues of territorial sovereignty (who owns which disputed islands) and maritime delimitation (how conflicting national water boundary claims should be resolved) and that China has never consented to any third party impartial arbitration of these issues.
China’s argument here is misleading. The tribunal has already indicated that its award will not decide those issues but will only concern itself with other important questions, all of which involve the interpretation and application of UNCLOS and are therefore within the tribunal’s decision-making authority. By ratifying the Convention, which requires compulsory dispute resolution and commits all parties to abide by whatever decision results, China clearly consented to accept the arbitration tribunal’s decision.
For example, the tribunal may amplify the meaning of the crucial Article 121.3 of the Convention by clarifying and applying the criteria for determining whether or not an island, no matter who owns it, is entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf as well as the 12 nautical mile territorial sea that attaches to every island.
The tribunal may also clarify the relationship of the Convention to national maritime claims that existed prior to adoption of the Convention. In particular, it may decide whether China’s ambiguous ‘nine-dash-line’ — which first appeared on a Chinese government map after World War II before the current Communist government was established — should be deemed an ‘historic right’ that survived the Convention’s adoption.
The Convention plainly provides for the determination of such questions by an impartial, independent group of five specialists whose membership and rules of procedure are prescribed at length. No further consent is required from any nation that has ratified the Convention and has a relevant claim brought against it.
When China ratified the Convention and agreed to be bound by any decision that resulted from such a compulsory third party determination, this consent was a free exercise of Chinese sovereignty and a solemn international treaty commitment to respect and comply with whatever decision emerged from the proceedings.
Of course, since China argues that in substance the issues raised by the arbitration involve questions of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation — and are therefore outside the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction — it has the right to present these arguments for the tribunal’s determination. But China declined to participate in the tribunal’s proceedings, unilaterally claiming that, since to its own satisfaction its arguments are legally correct, it need not present them for the tribunal’s impartial consideration. Despite this, the tribunal has done its best to evaluate China’s jurisdictional arguments.
Just think what a legal system the world would have if a country that has consented to compulsory third party decision-making — as countries have in over 90 international agreements — could simply renounce its solemn treaty promise while remaining within the treaty system and thumb its nose at the decision of the authorised independent tribunal. The provisions of UNCLOS clearly prohibit such conduct, which obviously constitutes a violation of international law.
China is evidently frantic to avoid being branded a violator of international law, even though, as its supporters point out, the United States, in a dispute with Nicaragua three decades ago, ignored a decision of the International Court of Justice after the court rejected its claim that the court lacked jurisdiction. That unfortunate action of the Reagan administration continues to damage the US’s reputation to this day. Washington’s reluctance to accept impartial third party dispute resolution may well be one of the reasons why the United States, disappointingly, has never ratified UNCLOS.
China’s current leaders, apparently only recently aware of the widespread opposition to their South China Sea legal stance, have been striving to limit the damage Beijing is about to suffer. Their spokespeople have presented all sorts of unpersuasive defences of their government’s refusal to honour its UNCLOS commitment. A few have even argued that China, by denouncing the tribunal’s allegedly improper actions, has become the true defender of international law. Instead of trying to stand international law on its head, China would be wiser to renew bilateral negotiations with the Philippines on the basis of the tribunal’s binding decision.
Jerome A. Cohen is Director of the US-Asia Law Institute, an NYU law professor and adjunct senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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