2016年12月14日 星期三

【 從美國兩位重要官員所撰文 看川普的外交大戰略 】

川普外交戰略大家都還在觀察,以下兩位重要人物寫的兩篇重要文章分別從支持與批評角度看,或可看出川普外交戰略。

歐巴馬的現在的副國務卿布林肯(Antony Blinken),投稿給紐約時報,批評川普的外交布局。在末段可見其義,個人認為就是講「價值」。儘管川普有可能對台灣更好,但個人認為「共同的價值觀」還是比「國家利益」更重要。

另一篇是可能擔任川普副國務卿的現任美國駐聯合國大使波頓(John Bolton)所寫。那是在蔡英文當選總統次日,他寫的「打台灣牌」,好像就是川普現在所做。

下為上述二重要人物所撰二文:
What Is America Without Influence? Trump Will Find Out.
New York Times, OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR By ANTONY J. BLINKEN December 14, 2016

WASHINGTON — In February 1945, in the twilight of World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill convened in Yalta, a Russian resort town in the Crimea, to deliberate on the direction of the war and the peace to follow. They agreed to a postwar order managed by Roosevelt’s “Four Policemen” — the United States, Britain, Russia and China.

Roosevelt was convinced he could cajole Stalin into keeping his Yalta commitments to collective security and an undivided Europe. Stalin had a very different vision: a world shaped by spheres of influence within which the will of the strongest prevails. In the Soviet sphere, darkness descended on Eastern Europe for 45 years.

It fell to President Harry Truman to contain Soviet expansionism. He built America’s first peacetime alliances, starting in Western Europe, then in Asia. The United States took the lead in shaping the norms, rules and institutions of what became the liberal international order, including the United Nations, the international financial institutions and the Marshall Plan.

The liberal order led by the United States favored an open world connected by the free flow of people, goods, ideas and capital, a world grounded in the principles of self-determination and sovereignty for nations and basic rights for their citizens. It did fall short of its ideals, often in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Yet despite the hair-trigger tensions of the Cold War, it produced decades of peace between the great powers while building shared prosperity.

The postwar order that America built now is facing acute challenges, including from old competitors. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, is no Stalin and Russia is no Soviet Union. But Mr. Putin does seek to recreate a Russian sphere of influence while picking apart the liberal international order that prevailed in the Cold War. China remains focused on stability at home, but the “new model of great power relations” it has proposed to the United States would have us stick to our side of the Pacific and let China play the pre-eminent role on its side.

America’s allies in Europe and Asia are fixated on whether the Donald Trump administration will reject the re-emergence of spheres of influence or embrace them. They worry that, in his campaign, Mr. Trump seemed to approve of the “strong” leadership of autocrats and favor a transactional approach to Mr. Putin. He showed little concern about Russia’s cybermeddling in our election or aggression in Ukraine while suggesting that NATO is “obsolete.” He argued that the United States should get out of the business of “defending the world” and described Japan and South Korea as free riders that should pick up the burden of their own defense and nuclear deterrence.

He has promised to jettison the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, ceding to China economic leadership and strategic influence in Asia. For many Europeans and Asians, these proclamations translate into a world in which the United States retreats into its cocoon, and Russia and China dominate them in both political and economic spheres.

The United States must not see China or Russia through a zero-sum prism. The Obama administration has deepened areas of cooperation with Beijing, from the Paris climate agreement, the handling of the Ebola epidemic, the Iran nuclear deal and North Korea to joint projects in developing countries. It negotiated the New Start nuclear arms reduction treaty with Moscow and championed Russia’s admission into the World Trade Organization.

Yet when Russia or China challenge the principles of the liberal international order, the United States must stand up to them. In Ukraine, Mr. Putin has sought to change the borders of Russia’s neighbor by force while denying its people the right to decide with which countries, unions or alliances they associate. It is why American support for Ukraine matters.

So does our resolute support for international law in the South China Sea. There, China’s conduct in claiming vast territorial waters and building military outposts on artificial islands risks undermining the freedom of navigation and free flow of commerce upon which our prosperity depends, the peaceful resolution of disputes that undergirds stability and the rights of allies we have vowed to defend.

A sphere-of-influence world would not be peaceful or stable; the United States will not be immune to its violent disruptions. Hegemons are rarely content with what they’ve got; the demand to expand their zones as well as cycles of rebellion and repression within them will lead to conflicts that draw us in. The United States would have to accept permanent commercial disadvantage as economic spheres of influence shut us out or incite a race to the bottom for workers, the environment, intellectual property and transparency.

America’s greatest contribution to peace and progress has been laying the foundation for an open, rules-based, connected world. Now we have to decide whether to continue to defend, amend and build upon that foundation or become complicit in dismantling it.
Antony J. Blinken is the deputy secretary of state.


下文搜尋一下應可見全文:
The U.S. Can Play a ‘Taiwan Card’
The Wall Street Journal, By JOHN BOLTON, Jan. 17, 2016 1:04 p.m. ET

If China won’t back down in East Asia, Washington has options that would compel Beijing’s attention.

Taiwan’s elections have returned the Democratic Progressive Party to power. Rolling over the incumbent Kuomintang (KMT) nationalists, the DPP won both the presidency and a legislative majority, giving it controls of both elective branches for the first time.

President-elect Tsai Ing-wen didn’t center her campaign on attacking the KMT policy of closer relations with China, focusing instead on Taiwan’s lagging economy, but neither did she reject the bedrock DPP platform of independence from China. Her rhetoric, including...

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